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143
Condorcet Winners for Public Goods
, 2005
"... In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the ma ..."
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In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than
Condorcet Winner Probabilities A Statistical Perspective
, 2005
"... A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of n odd or even ..."
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A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of n odd
A Note on the Query Complexity of the Condorcet Winner Problem
"... Given an unknown tournament over {1,..., n}, we show that the query complexity of the question “Is there a vertex with outdegree n − 1? ” (known as a Condorcet winner in social choice theory) is exactly 2n − ⌊log(n) ⌋ − 2. This stands in stark contrast to the evasiveness of this property in general ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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Given an unknown tournament over {1,..., n}, we show that the query complexity of the question “Is there a vertex with outdegree n − 1? ” (known as a Condorcet winner in social choice theory) is exactly 2n − ⌊log(n) ⌋ − 2. This stands in stark contrast to the evasiveness of this property
Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner
"... We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of m objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of the algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet winner both for linear and for weak preference orders. 1. ..."
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We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of m objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of the algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet winner both for linear and for weak preference orders. 1.
When Voters Strategize, Approval Voting Elects Condorcet Winners but Condorcet Methods can Elect Condorcet Losers
, 2007
"... We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear fontrunner F and runnerup R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runnerup. In contrast, we show that marginsbased ..."
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We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear fontrunner F and runnerup R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runnerup. In contrast, we show that margins
Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have otherregarding preferences
, 2009
"... In standard political economy models voters are ‘selfinterested’, i.e., care only about ‘own’utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have ‘otherregarding preferences’, i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payo¤s relative to others. We ext ..."
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, we show, quite generally, that under FehrSchmidt preferences voters will care for others when voting over redistribution but choose labour supply so as to maximize own utility. Second, we prove that a Condorcet winner exists when voters have FehrSchmidt preferences in the special case when the own
Updated June 2008Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have
, 2008
"... otherregarding preferences ..."
Downsian competition in the absence of a Condorcet winner Jesper Roine∗
, 2003
"... This paper studies twoparty electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other’s choices, altering one’s policy platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where ..."
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This paper studies twoparty electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other’s choices, altering one’s policy platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is that the game ends in the first period with the parties converging on whatever platform the incumbent chooses. If, however, there is a slight chance of a small mistake, the incumbent does best in choosing a local equilibrium platform. This suggests that local equilibrium policies can be the predicted outcome even if the voting process is not myopic in any way.
Ranking from Stochastic Pairwise Preferences: Recovering Condorcet Winners and Tournament Solution Sets at the Top
"... We consider the problem of ranking n items from stochastically sampled pairwise preferences. It was shown recently that when the underlying pairwise preferences are acyclic, several algorithms including the Rank Centrality algorithm, the Matrix Borda algorithm, and the SVMRankAggregation algorithm ..."
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. For example, if a Condorcet winner exists that beats every other item, it is natural to ask that this be ranked at the top. More generally, several tournament solution concepts such as the top cycle, Copeland set, Markov set and others have been proposed in the social choice literature for choosing a
Results 1  10
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143